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CONTINUITY IN MEXICO’S SECURITY POLICE AND HISTORICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM 
ANAÍS MEDEIROS PASSOS
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INTRODUCTION  
 
This paper intends to analyze the historical evolution of military involvement in internal 
security affairs of Mexico since the late 1940s. Recently, many critics have written 
extensively about  Mexico’s heavily militarized policy  towards  drug trafficking and 
the organized crime (f.ex: Moloeznik 2010; Manaut 2009; Artz 2003). But without 
recognizing the historical continuities underlying such policy model, we cannot fully 
comprehend its origins and effectiveness. Historical-institutionalism is a useful 
theoretical approach when we are dealing with slow-moving process not captured by a 
short-time perspective. This approach has emphasized how things that have been 
institutionalized are inert and  un-changed (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). They consider 
institutions to generate different sets of power distribution that can be changed 
according to the actors’ will. Pierson (Pierson 2000) in the work “Politics in Time” has 
argued that since what characterizes science is the discovery of causal relations we 
should consider time itself as an intervenient variable. In fact, causes and consequences 
may be separated over time and it may be useful to stretch the temporal horizon of a 
given analysis.  
In the first section of this paper, I will explore historical institutionalism and the main 
theoretical predictions on how institutions can be a strong obstacle against change. 
More specifically, I will briefly present the work of Pierson. In the second section I will 
analyze Mexico’s most important events concerning public security and militarization 
in the light of the theories previously presented since late 1940s. Lastly, I will proceed 
to our final conclusions and remarks. 
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 HISTORICAL NEOINSTUTIONALISM 
 
How and why public policy tends to change is a contemporary question that has guided 
interesting research by political scientists, historians and sociologists. For example, 
Muller (1992) has emphasized how the relation between international and local factors 
has led to the decadence of the French sectorial corporatism. Hall (1993) has elaborated 
how social learning, together with sociological factors, may contribute  to change 
political paradigms that guide public policy. Notwithstanding, if we are dealing with 
events that are characterized more by continuity than change, a different theoretical 
approach can be more appropriate. Historical institutionalism has been defined  (Pierson 
and Skocpol 1997) an approach that underlies how institutions are simultaneously a way 
of decreasing uncertainty when actors behave strategically and of framing a vision of 
world that defines certain lines of actions.  
It is important to emphasize that although continuity is the main topic addressed by 
historical institutionalism, those approaches have also developed different answers to 
the issue of institutional change. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) have emphasized how 
internal change in power distribution engendered by subversive actors can promote 
gradual but powerful institutional modifications. By contrast, Pierson (2004) stresses 
how external chocks can generate impact over institutions and promote change.  
Pierson (2004) argues that time and sequence matter. That is why certain trajectories 
when started are difficult to reverse: the advantages of the current activity usually 
surmount those of change. Path dependence  refers to social processes that are self-
reinforcing, entailing positive feedback and generating “branching patterns of historical 
development” (Pierson 2004, 21). According to the author, path dependence can 
actually explain most of the important events in social history.  
A second point made by Pierson pertains to the phenomenon of “increasing returns”, 
related to the first set of characteristics. This concept means that actors usually have an 
important reason to remain in one direction once the initial move has been taken 
towards. Technological development can actually help to elucidate many features of 
social interactions and consequently those of increasing returns (ibidem, p. 24).  There 
are considerable start-up costs that may at first discourage new social initiatives. But 
they also generate a high payoff for further investment in a given technology once the 
initial costs have been overcome. Secondly, learning effects encourage that once people 
acquire the knowledge necessary to handle with complex systems, higher returns will be 
gained from a continuing use. By its turn, coordination effects refer to the fact that 
technology may include network externalities, especially when they are connected with 
a given infrastructure. So people will be more willing to do further investment in the 
already existing technology. Lastly, Pierson emphasizes the role of adaptive 
expectations. Calculations about future are adapted to the current situation and tend to 
be self-fulfilling. That is, changes are not very welcome when someone has made 
his/her entire future plans since there is a current expectation that things will remain the 
same.  
Microeconomic theory has based many finding on these features to explain the unequal 
and ever-lasting character of international trade. Pierson innovates by adapting them to 
politics. Positive feedback tends to prevail in politics due to a number of characteristics 
that are present in social relations. For instance, collective actions embody a diffuse 
relation between efforts and outcome. That is precisely the dilemma of collective action 
outlined by the literature. Frequently, the incentives for behaving as a free-rider surpass 
those of engaging for the pursue of a common good. Adaptive expectations, meaning 
that everything depends on the other(s), are a key-point for strategic behaviors. 
Institutions that generate collective agreements mandatory for all individuals are a way 
of surmounting those dilemmas of actions, in a context of complex interdependence. 
Again, institutions tend to reinforce a given path and reward those that follow it.  
The high degree of uncertainty and information asymmetry in politics gives incentives 
for actors to be more conservative and follow their present mental maps. We can expect 
a general tendency of conservative behavior in politics due to the complexity and 
limited nature of available information.  Lastly, an actor that imposes his/her political 
authority by coercion to other actors can increase even more information asymmetry.   
In addition to those characteristics, the author identifies the reasons why positive 
feedback can be especially intense in politics. Agents act with a short-time horizon, 
meaning that they are mostly worried with elections that at its best refer to a mandate 
for the next six years in office. There are also strong incentives for maintaining the 
status quo because politics are complex and uncertain. And, differently from the price-
mechanisms that help to allocate resources with best efficiency, there is an absence of 
mechanisms for efficiency and learning in politics.  
When the process of self-reinforcing is present in politics, a number of characteristics 
will also be present. Inertia, meaning that when a process is going on, positive feedback 
tends to generate a balance and discourage change. Contingency, referring to the fact 
that small and perhaps insignificant events can create, in a given juncture, ever-lasting 
effects. And a multiple balance, because a given initial set of conditions embodies 
multiple and diverse outcomes. Together, these characteristics may increase even more 
the complexity and uncertainty underlying decisions in a political environment.   
Since we do not intend to summarize all Pierson’s argument, we will just add that he 
identifies what he calls threshold effects in big slowing processes. Change may occur in 
a very gradual and slow way. In many cases, those cumulative forces may have a very 
modest effect over the variable of interest until they reach a critical level that can 
stimulate major changes (Pierson 2003). That’s why certain big, slow-moving processes 
can be invisible when our analysis is restricted to a short-time horizon. 
 
SOME USEFUL CONCEPTS AND LEGAL DEFINITIONS 
 
Before proceeding to the next section, it is useful to clarify some concepts and legal 
definitions mentioned in this paper. Militarization has been used by different authors    
(f.ex. Artz 2003; Freeman and Luis Sierra 2005; Fazio 1996; Moloeznik 2010) to 
explain how civil-military relations in Mexico have evolved recently. Artz (Artz 2003) 
says that militarization is not only the presence of military members in traditional civil 
government areas (public security, attorney general, intelligence service). It also refers 
to a broader process where there’s no investment in checks and balances mechanisms 
and most part of human and economic resources are directed to the military 
establishment. Zaverucha (Zaverucha 2008, p. 5) defines it as a process where Armed 
Forces’ values get closer to those of society. Lastly, for Dunn  (J. Dunn 1996a) it is a 
direct and indirect involvement of military forces in tasks of law enforcement.  
The Program for National Defense (2009-2012) posits that national security involves 
“The protection of the Mexican nation against threats and risks faced by our country”, 
among them are armed groups, organized crime, borders vulnerability and the drug 
trafficking. Today one can argue that there is not a clear definition of external defense 
and internal security in Mexico’s legislation. But that is connected to the inherent nature 
of those menaces that have a transnational modus operandis.  
According to the Organic Law of the Mexican Army and Air Force (26/121986) the 
Mexican Army and Air Force have, among their general missions, to guarantee internal 
security and external defense. As Sandoval (Sandoval Palacios 2000, 2) writes, public 
security and internal security have been gradually interpreted as equivalent and 
interchangeable terms. Additionally, more than one legal interpretation have classified 
as legitimate in Mexico their involvement with tasks related to public security (Artz, 
2003)
2
 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Loveman (Loveman 1999) analyzes the case of Latin American armed forces and their 
relation to the nation. Based on a cultural approach and historical institutionalism, he 
develops an interesting portrait of continuity in civil-military relations in Latin America. 
The role of the military is not only defined by constitutional and legal norms, he argues, 
but also by a set of beliefs and expectations consolidated throughout decades and that 
form part of national political culture, which reflect both the military tradition of Iberia 
and the legacy of Portuguese and Spanish colonialism. As part of Latin American 
political culture, armed forces historically are seen as guardians in a “protected 
democracy”, that have to defend the nation from both internal and external threats 
(ibidem, xiv). Military officers usually say they are subordinated to civilian authorities, 
with the exception when they perceive that civilians have exceed their power or the 
nation is in danger. In fact, it’s a common practice in the region that constitutions assign 
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to the military several political guardianships such as “upholding the constitution, 
maintaining law and order, and the overall tutelage of the nation’s sovereignty” (ibidem, 
xiii). So it’s a central issue who and how someone can decide if the nation is in danger. 
Historically analyzing the presence of the military in national administrations, the 
author begins his study at the 18th century. Early as 1780, military reforms have 
consolidated the role of captains-generals as one of the most important administrative 
officials in Iberian America, also giving them a permanent role in maintaining internal 
order and fighting political subversion. In fact, Loveman says that the military were the 
first national institution in Spanish America (ibidem, 15). This fact helped to 
consolidate the military’s identity as guardians of the nation. Throughout the 19th 
century, wars and rebellions were constant and we’ve assisted to a gradual militarization 
of Latin America with the political prominence of caudillos in national politics. They 
were generals and colonels once part of the rebel armies engaged with independent war, 
being rewarded with land grants for their service that keep doing politics according to 
their own objectives. 
 The Mexican Revolution that started in 1910 is a key event for understanding Mexico’s 
history. But actually we can trace back the historical patterns of military subordination 
and engagement in internal affairs to the period known as Porfiriato (1876-1911)
3
. 
Previously Mexico faced foreign invasion and a civil war. As the historian Jorge 
Alberto Lozoya writes, historically, the National Army has been oriented to internal 
rather than external operations. During the Porfiriato’s period, the army’s main mission 
was to protect the government system based on reciprocities (sistema de fidelidades 
comprometidas)(Lozoya 1976, 34)  In fact, the political stability during Porfírio Diaz’s 
rule was a great achievement in the early history of Mexico, being know as “la paz 
porfiriana” (the profirian peace).  López González (2012) writes that the Army 
converted itself into a guarantor of the President’s authority. Since there was no need to 
handle with civil or internal conflicts, the armed forces in this phase were mostly busy 
with internal security. Among their responsibilities, according to the author (ibidem, 
66), was to suppress local rebellions and pacify or eradicate groups of bandits that were 
on the roads, between villages, cities and plantations. Also it is important stressing that 
these military officers had as mission to suppress political enemies of the regime and to 
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collect information on subversive activity. Kidnapping, extrajudicial killings and torture 
were means largely employ to protect the Porfiriato regime from political dissent. At the 
same time, Lozoya (1976) identifies the first records of modernization inside the armed 
forces. All the programs organized by the Military College (Colegio Militar) were 
updated, following the French and German models. But these efforts were interrupted 
by the Mexican Revolution in 1910.  
Concerning the employment of the military establishment as an instrument to protect 
the regime, Porfirio Diaz supported several measures that intended to neutralize their 
participation in politics. (Rouquié 2013, p. 83) writes that: “L’ancien militaire 
putschiste se méfie de l’armée et des géneraux ». He reduces the size of troops and their 
budget, and also persecutes those that oppose to his policy. In 1880, 78% of state offices 
were occupied by military. This picture progressively changed. As Porfírio Diaz 
consolidated his power, military members gradually retreated from politics and 
administration. 
The Revolution of 1910 contributed to the emergence of a new form of militarism. Ai 
Camp (Ai Camp 1992; Ai Camp 2005) is an author that has extensively explored the 
idea of Mexican Armed Forces as a professional corps created in the light of a social 
revolution.  He stresses that in Mexico an army of civilian origin defeated the 
established military of Porfírio Diaz. Both political and military leaderships emerged 
from this experience in common. This shared political socialization may explain why 
this country is a unique case in Latin America of military subordination to civilian 
authorities. Such characteristic can also account,  Ai Camp writes, for the prevention of 
a caste mentality among military officers. But at the same time they enjoyed good levels 
of autonomy in their corporative issues.  
Notwithstanding, it is important to stress that until the creation of the National 
Revolutionary Party in 1929 (Partido Revolucionario Institutional, PNR), power 
transitions were based in disputes between Army’s factions and the revolutionaries that 
usually ended with some kind of military conflict. The armed forces started to be 
insulated from politics with the presidency of general Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1949). 
Such tendency was consolidated by the next president, general Manuel Ávila Camacho 
(1940-1946), the last military president of Mexico’s history.  
In 1945, when the PRM (Partido de la Revolución Mexicana) was reorganized and 
renamed as PRI (Partido de la Revolución Institucional), no military candidature was 
presented. Edwin Liewen writes that the social mission enjoyed by the armed forces as 
guardians of the nation during the first quarter of the Revolution had gradually been 
eroded.  Eventually they became, “ a pliable and disciplined tool of the civilian leaders 
of the Mexican nation” (Lieuwen 1968, 149). From 1950 onwards, the author says that 
the deterioration of military’s influence in politics went along with the ascension of 
civilian political forces. While the decision-making process was in the hands of 
civilians, military increasingly lost political importance.   
Although Liewen emphasizes the loss of importance of military members, the 
specialized literature on Mexican civil-military relations diverges on this issue.  
Apolitical could be an easy definition for Mexico’s Army after the Mexican Revolution, 
since the country did not face a military coup—making it unique amongst Latin 
American polities during the 1960s and the 1970s, as it enjoyed successive tenures by 
civilian governments. Notwithstanding, studies on civil-military relations in Mexico 
during the 1970s and the 1980s said that the political role played by the militia was far 
from disappearing. 
 Lozoya (1976) describes the gradual process of insulating Mexican military from 
politics and becoming professional, but he actually identifies a number of activities that 
were developed to sustain the regime, contradicting himself. He writes that history 
seems to demonstrate that the Mexican Army was always more in service to internal 
than external causes. Rural defense corps were composed of peasants, to guarantee 
internal order, controlling the rural population and the territory. Also, they created an 
extraordinary mechanism of information that permitted the national government to 
monitor any subversive activity against the regime. Clearly this rural militia was 
political. Additionally, the role played by the chiefs in zones (that correspond to the 
state boundaries) was also political, since these generals could replace the governors in 
case there was a conflict between the federal government and the state. Only after the 
second World War, a system of rotation in military zones would be institutionalized to 
avoid close political ties between generals and local political forces that could 
jeopardize PRI’s hegemony.   
A second line of reasoning refers to specific roles played by the Armed Forces in more 
recent years. Authors such as Ai Camp (2005) and Ronfeldt (1985) have empirically 
demonstrated how the Armed Forces still conserve political roles through their strict 
loyalty to the Executive Power. According to Ai Camp (2005, 15–16) military’s 
involvement with internal affairs has serious implications for democracy. Among the 
issues raised by such tasks are the exposure of high ranking officers to corruption,  
human right abuses without any punishment, enhancement of the military’s public 
image in comparison to civilian authorities and the supremacy of the military over 
civilian authorities in many regions part of the anti-drug campaign such as Oaxaca, 
Sinaloa, Jalisco and Guerrero.  
Ronfeldt (1985) envisages a potential closer cooperation between civilians and the 
military that could place them at a more central role into the political system at a 
moment where the PRI was starting to face a gradual loss of political strength. A 
modernized army corps, with improved institutional, technocratic and managerial skills 
could have extended roles in resolving the agenda on domestic and foreign security. But 
this, following his argument, would not provoke political instability and led to a military 
coup since the military’s role were more likely to expand their roles in order to assist 
the civilian government, not to destabilize it, being support by the Executive. The 
central question is: has the security policy in Mexico been more militarized in the last 
twenty years, or are we just paying more attention to this fact? And how can we assess 
the degree of change behind it? 
Historically, Mexican armed forces have been involved with multiple tasks typically 
carried out by civilian agencies. As early as 1938, Astorga (2007) identifies cases of 
eradication of crops at Sonora, with the support of agent Scharff from the United States 
Treasury Department. In the years after, more campaigns were deployed in the northeast 
of the country with the Army support and policy advice from US agents. On October 
1947, the Attorney-General’s Office, the National Defense Secretariat and the Public 
Health Secretariat deployed a new campaign (Astorga 2007, 57). The Army and the 
Marine provided support with personnel, weaponry and logistic for searching crops.  
In addition to their role in the fight against drug trade, Ai Camp (2005, 100) stresses 
that civic action is another element of Mexico’s residual political roles. Those policies 
are related with development projects and are directed to ordinary citizens, being a 
component of the armed forces revolutionary tradition. Many analysts say this can blur 
the distinction between civilian and military missions, and also jeopardize civilian 
leadership. In the 1950s, the Army was involved with activities such as Little League 
baseball and the transportation of anti-malaria drugs.  In the 1960s, almost 60% of 
military budget was destined to civic actions, including veterinary checkups and the 
distribution of potable water.   
Ai Camp (2005) also stresses the historical connection of the Mexican Federal Security 
Department
4
 with the military, a relation that was supported by an intentional civilian 
policy that saw the armed forces as an instrument to suppress political dissent. The 1952 
edition of the basic manual on military ethics gave priority to the preservation of 
internal order while the defense of the national territory was placed at third. Between 
1958-1959, the military was employed to suppress railroad works strikes and in 1960 
the military was again used to repress telephone and postal workers. In 1968, a student 
demonstration was strongly repressed by military forces at Tlatelolco Plaza (ibidem, 
102-103). 
The ideology of internal warfare that influenced all Latin American countries in the 
Cold War era justified the employment of military forces to suppress insurgent 
movement. In Mexico, Monica Serrano writes that this goes on specially during the 
1960s and the 1970s (Serrano 1995). Mainly in rural areas in the state of Guerrero, 
guerrilla groups were strongly combated by the armed forces. They were groups like the 
one formally known as Asociación Cívica Nacional Revolucionária (ACNR), in the 
southeast, and Partido de los Pobres, that had many clandestine committees along 
Guerrero’s Serra (López González 2012, 211–212). According to the author, it was not 
easy for military forces to adapt their operations for those areas.  Initially (1970-1972) a 
high number of military members were seriously injured or dead during combat. But at 
the end almost all guerrilla groups were eliminated while several human rights 
violations were committed, during what it is known by Mexicans today as “la Guerra 
Sucia” (the Dirty War).  
Decades later, in an official statement, the USA Secretary of National Defense said that 
national security was the third link necessary to strengthen Mexico-US relations (Fazio 
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1996, 174). It is important to stress that low-intensity conflict (LIC) doctrines in the 80s 
were applied not only to counter insurgent movements, but also to fight against the drug 
trade. In fact, as Timothy Dunn explores in his book (J. Dunn 1996a), antidrug 
operations became one of the more dynamics components of LIC doctrine. Such policy 
principles were systematized during Reagan’s administration (1981-1989), aiming to 
combat and suppress revolutionary movements in the Third World. LIC doctrine entails 
a set of sophisticated measures that ideally should be employed in advance, before an 
actual armed conflict takes place. Also, police and military functions tend to perform 
similar functions, blurring the line between them.  
The issue of drug trafficking gained prominence during the 1980s, becoming a 
dominant element of both US domestic and foreign policies (J. Dunn 1996b)(Wola. 
Oficina de Asuntos Latinoamericanos en Washington. 1993). Reagan (1981-1989) and 
Bush (1989-1992) administrations coordinated highly publicized antidrug efforts to 
limit the supply of illegal drugs in the USA.  According to (Isacson 2005) the War on 
Drugs provided a new rationale for military operations against an internal enemy in 
Latin America. Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s Washington encouraged Latin 
American and Caribbean nations to militarize their counterdrug efforts through 
economic incentives and diplomatic pressure.   
Employing around 10.000 Mexican soldiers, Operation Condor was an important event 
for the future of anti-narcotics campaign in the country. Its objective was to eradicate 
pavot and cannabis crops in the states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Durango (Astorga, 
2007, 56). Jesús Lopéz-González (Lopéz-González 2012, 74) writes that “ paradoxically 
during a moment of low pressure from the United States, the Mexican government 
launched the strongest campaign ever known against drug trafficking in the country to 
eradicate illicit drug crops and dismember domestic drug-trafficking organizations”. 
Even though this military operation was successful in helping to reduce the offer of 
marijuana in the USA market from Mexico suppliers, (from 40 percent in 1977 to 3 
percent in 1981), Colombian drug dealers soon filled this gap (ibidem, p. 74). In spite of 
this “half victory”, Operation Condor served as a model for a militarized policy to 
combat drug trafficking in Mexico, a tendency that would increase in the following 
decades. 
The National Development Plan (NDP) elaborated during Carlos Salina de Gortari’s  
term (1988-1994) contributed towards further institutionalization of the involvement of 
Mexican armed forces into internal affairs (Artz 2003, 6).  Such document, that serves 
to set the priorities of security policy, recognized drug trade and trafficking as a serious 
threat to Mexico’s national security. As a consequence, combating drug trafficking was 
a task incorporated into the realm of armed forces’ general missions. Even though the 
NDP emphasized they should only assist the Attorney General, this relation soon 
evolved to a closer cooperation between the Attorney General’s Office and the Defense 
Department (Lopéz-González 2012). These policies included military training for police 
members and the replacement of corrupt police officers by “trustworthy” military 
members. 
In the next years, during Ernesto Zedillo’s presidential term (1994-2000), a series of 
reforms were introduced in an effort to restructure and modernize the armed forces. 
Priority was given to the task of coordination of elite troops for  deployment  in urban 
and rural areas (Palacios, 2000, p.16) In 1995, the Law Establishing the General Basis 
of the National Council of Public Security provided a further justification for involving 
more military members in domestic affairs. This law gave a formal role to the military 
in public security decision making and policy making as an official member of the 
National Public Security Council (Freeman and Luis Sierra 2005, 268). 
 During the second half of Ernesto Zedillo’s term, a National Campaign against the 
Crime (Cruzada Nacional contra el Crimen) was organized to reduce crime levels and 
modernize police departments. This operation was supported by Mexico’s armed forces 
and sough to combat inefficiency and corruption among police officers.  That same 
year, President Zedillo created the Federal Preventive Police, a new security agency that 
had almost 5,500 members coming directly from the Army and Navy (Lopéz-González 
2012, 85). Lastly, a decision of the Mexican Supreme Court gave a further legal 
justification for employing the armed forces in public security operations. Such 
statement claimed that the armed forces were allowed to intervene in public security 
matters as long as civilian authorities requested to. (Moloeznik 2005) 
An important clarification is about how drug trafficking has evolved in Mexico in the 
last twenty years. The specialized literature  (Valdés Castellanos 2012; Astorga 2007; 
Moloeznik 2010; Rivelois 2004; Rivelois 1999)  has classified the period from 1950 to 
1980 as “La Paz Mafiosa”. These authors agree that there were collusive networks 
between drug dealers and state agents in several spheres of the government. The 
political system consolidated after the Mexican Revolution, especially since the creation 
of the PRI in the late 1940s, made it possible to concentrate power in the hands of the 
presidential authority. Consequently, the President was able to make political agreement 
with the federal, state and local level to accomplish his/her goals. Also, until the 1980s 
most part of drug trafficking in Mexico was controlled by two organizations, the 
Sinaloa Cartel and the Golfo Cartel. It was easier to control (or negociate with)  two 
criminal organizations then several smaller groups. Many authors say there was an 
informal agreement for a peaceful coexistence between these cartels and the 
government. While the former had permission to “do business”, the later was able to 
control violence levels and also get economic assets in exchange.   
The imprisonment of important cartel leaders during the late 1980s, such as Rafael Caro 
Quintero, Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo and Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo provoked 
fragmentation and the appearance of new criminal groups, such as the Tijuana Cartel, 
and Juárez Cartel. So in the 1990s a new phase begun, in which there was a constant 
dispute between criminal organizations to expand or regain their “territory” (Valdés 
Castellanos 2012). Together with the decaying of PRI, that since 1988 started to lose 
hegemony in state elections, this led to higher levels of violence in the 90s and 
following decades.  
 Vicente Fox (2000-2006) from PAN (Partido de la Acción Nacional) was the first 
president not belonging to the PRI to be elected since the creation of this political party.  
His election was historical for what is called as Mexico’s transition towards a less 
centralized and more democratic system (Ai, Camp 2014). Even though PRI was not the 
single existing party before, PRI’s candidates were able to perpetuate itself on power 
during decades. While this election has an important meaning for Mexico’s democracy 
and society as a whole, security policy has mostly maintained the same guidelines.  
Vicente Fox designated a military general, Rafael Macedo de la Concha, to head the 
Attorney’s General Office. Such decision raised several criticisms. For example, Sigrid 
Artz (Artz 2003) identifies, as adverse effects, the jeopardizing of military’ and 
intelligence agencies’ professionalism. It was feared that it may provoke and increase 
tensions inside the Army and in their relation with the Attorney’s General Office.  She 
also posits that in the last years there was an increased deviation of the armed forces 
towards traditionally non-military tasks, such as fighting against the organizing crime 
and policing functions. This would also be strengthen, Sigrid Artz adds, because USA 
training and financial add, a non-negligible amount, are directed to those issues. 
Consequently, there is an extra motivation to keep investing in this kind of militarized 
security model.  
Since 2005, several special operations were realized in most violent areas throughout 
Mexico’s territory (Astorga 2007, 234).  They were part of the Plan Mexico Seguro. 
These operations by definition involved military members working along with police 
officers to counter drug trafficking and the organized crime. As in the low-intensity 
doctrine, civilian and military tasks appeared to be rather undifferentiated. In late 2005, 
an operation was conducted in the state of Guerrero  (Dávila 2011). Next year, in 
November 2005 military members and the Federal Agency of Investigation engaged in 
joint operations in the city of Montemorelos (Nuevo León), near La Valentina’s farm 
and El Bravo’s farm, whose proprietary was assumed to be of the well-known drug 
dealer Joaquín ‘el Chapo’ Guzmán. 
During his administration, Vicente Fox took several measures in order to restructure the 
security apparatus. He created the Secretariat of Public Security, a cabinet-agency level 
connected directly to the President and responsible for developing criminal policy. This 
agency was also in charge of cooperating closely with the Attorney General in 
combating drug trafficking and the organized crime. Roderic Ai Camp (2005, 118) 
writes that only two years in his administration 826 members of the Mexican army 
started to work in this agency. Additionally, the Army employed 33.794 troops monthly 
in 2001 in national security operations, representing an increase of 47 percent in 
comparison to 2000. The pattern of military involvement in internal security seems to 
have been remained unchanged. 
Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), also from the PAN, took office on December 2006. Ten 
days latter, he announced a national campaign against drug trafficking declaring it as his 
government’s top priority. Alain Rouquié (Rouquié 2013, 410) says this frontal attack 
led by the government against drug trafficking represents a rupture not only with his 
predecessor, Vicente Fox, fairly less active in this front, but also with the historical 
PRI’s policy of peaceful coexistence with the organized crime. Providing security to 
Mexican citizens is defined in the National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo – 2007-2012) as a guiding principle for all public policies led by the 
government.   
Several measures were taken by the government, aiming to reform the security system 
(Calderón, 2012). For example, the creation of a Unified Criminal Information System 
(Sistema Único de Información Criminal) and of a new Federal Police (Polícia Federal, 
PF), replacing the previous Federal Preventive Police (Polícia Federal Preventiva, 
PFP). The former police model kept separate preventive measures and crime fighting.   
According to the former Federal Secretary for Public Security in office at the time, 
Genaro García Luna, they are part of a new security model in Mexico that emphasizes 
more a police empowered to conduct investigations and to systematize information 
based on intelligence processes (García Luna 2011, 24–25). Another legal innovation 
was the creation of a Special Unit for Federal Support attached to the Army, that 
gathered 7 thousand men and women to intervene for the benefit of order and public 
security, against the organized crime and any act threatening  national security (DOF, 
04/may/2007) All those initiatives were made in a context where the organized crime 
was fragmented, being present at the entire border with the United States (from Tijuana 
until Montemorelos) and also at the west coast, from Oaxaca to Sonora (Valdés 
Castellano, 2012, 364).  
Plan Mexico Seguro was “radicalized” in his term, according to Felipe Calderón 
(Calderón, 2012, 8).  In December 2006, Michoacán joint operation started, gathering 
7000 men and women from  the Secretariat of National Defense (Secretaría de la 
Defensa Nacional, Sedena), the Secretariat of Marine (Secretaría de la Marina, Semar), 
the Federal Preventive Police (Policía Federal Preventiva, PFP) and the Federal 
Agency of Investigation (Agencia Federal de Investigación, AFI)  and the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (ASTORGA, 2007, p. 193). In the first half of 2007,  four more 
joint operations were conducted in the states of Michoacán, Tijuana, Sierra Madre and 
Guerrero. On August 2008, a National Agreement for Security, Justice and Legality was 
signed between the federal and local governments to set guidelines for coordinating all 
state levels in security police programs. Such coordination was essential for allowing 
joint missions to take place.  Military operations in the cities of Carácuaro and 
Nocupétaro (may/2007) were heavily criticized. The National Human Rights 
Commission (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos) received several complaints 
involving illegal detentions, tortures and searches without a legal warrant in these areas 
(El Universal, 08/05/2007). In 2011 joint operations were again deployed in the states of 
Veracruz, Guerrero, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas and in Laguna’s region. 
Charles Call (T. Call 2002) proposes a model that centers on the functions that were 
kept by the military after the transition and help to evaluate how much the Armed 
Forces are involved with internal security. He elaborates a security index to measure 
militarization before and after democratic transition, including variables such as: (1 ) the 
role ascribed by the Constitution to the armed forces in internal security, (2) the number 
of police officers that receives a formal military education, (3) military participation in 
intelligence systems, (4) main preventive officer’s corps, (5) legislative supervision on 
police forces, (6) legal jurisdiction on police men and women, (7) police doctrine.  
Jesus López Gonzalez (2012) applies this index to Mexico and concludes the country 
would have one of the lowest degrees of changing patterns of civil-military relations. 
Mexico would have militarized its system of public security after the democratic 
transition (2000), which is an uncommon event. How could we explain this kind of 
change? According to the author, by over evaluating the dimensions of historical 
dependence and critical junctures, we could underestimate the capacity of elites to 
change civil-military relations according to their short-term interests. The President, by 
delegating police functions to the Armed Forces, can show to the public he/she is 
responsible and committed with adopting “thought measures” in security. The extensive 
period of regime transition (that started with the state elections in 1988 and ended with 
the presidential elections of 2000) helped to promote a convergence of interests (ibidem, 
50). At one side, the armed forces, willing to insulate the institution from judicial and 
legislative control. At the other side, politicians that needed to associate themselves 
with the military to gain credibility and electoral support.  
Short-term interests and more pragmatic considerations may explain the increasing use 
of the armed forces in combating drug trafficking and the organized crime. The 
changing context of the organized crime during the late 1980s that entered into a more 
fragmented phase pressed governments to adopt tougher policies. Also the international 
context, with the USA leading a truly “war on drugs” and urging ally countries to join 
them into militarized practices. These events, together with the established role of the 
armed forces in public security, helped to advance the military role in public security 
since the early 1990s with Ernesto Zedillo.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS 
 
It is clear that even before the Mexican Revolution in 1910, the armed forces have been 
involved with internal affairs in the country.  Notwithstanding, since 1945 they have 
been outside electoral politics. We have not seen since then an attempt of coming back. 
Mexico’s military was tamed by civilian authorities in a time where most Latin 
American countries were handling with civil-military coups and authoritarian 
governments. This political formula has been based on a exclusive subordination to the 
President in office
5
. Historical institutionalism can explain why the armed forces are 
now so present in public security, even though this approach is not helpful to measure 
the degree of change underlying this continuity. Attitudes, beliefs, military doctrine, and 
formal institutions (legislation, decrees, executive decisions) previously operating made 
it easier for presidents to further institutionalize and advance military’s mission. If 
Mexico had a military that only fought international wars and was not present in 
domestic missions, presidents would find it harder to involve them in campaigns against 
drug trade and the organized crime. But this does not seem the case. As early as 1938 
we have identified military participation in operations to destruct illegal crops. 
Additionally, civic actions and political repression were common missions for the 
armed forces under the PRI’s rule.  The combat of guerrilla movements, influenced by 
the internal warfare doctrine, was incorporated to the large realm of military missions 
during the 1960s and the 1970s. During the late 1980s, Mexico saw as increasing 
concern with drug trade and violence due to the fragmentation of criminal groups. This 
phenomenon was responded with more military, helping to institutionalize a security 
model that has increased since the democratic transition. 
                                                          
5
 According to Jesús López González (2012) civil-military relations in Mexico are based on a dual 
relation of civilian control over the military. At the first level, the relation between the President and the 
Armed Forces is narrow and unequal, favoring the Executive’s authority. Notwithstanding, at the other 
levels of public administration, where the Army interacts with other state agencies, the relation changes as 
a result of the new responsibilities that were delegated from the Executive to the military. Differently 
from what occurs at the top of the pyramid, the Legislative Power has a limited supervision over the 
Marine and the Mexican Army. They only report their annual budget appropriation to the Superior 
Federal Auditor. (p. 50-51) 
Paul Pierson says that once a given direction is chosen, change is difficult because 
alternative paths are “obstructed” by this initial choice. Maintaining a chosen path is 
also awarded with increasing returns, since doing something we already know is easier 
than discovering something new and perhaps distant from our reality. Actually it does 
not make much sense to think actual security policies are blurring the line between 
national and internal security if historically there was not such division. Mexico’s 
military has been trained for ages to act in internal security affairs. It is less costly to 
invest in the already existing institution to combat new midlevel threats than creating a 
new professional corps to deal with such security menaces.  
It is important to emphasize that adopting the “easiest and shortest” path may create 
new problems in the future for Mexico’s democracy. Since we are dealing with 
contemporary events, we are not certain how the continuous use of the military can 
affect their subordination to civilian authorities in a recent democratic system. Maybe 
we can be dealing with a “big-slowing process”, quoting Paul Pierson, towards a new 
model of labor division between civilian and military missions in security, with an 
intermediate civil-military security agency between. If that’s the case, political 
scientists, by focusing on short-term results, may lack the appropriate tools to assess 
what is going on Mexico and how the balance between civilians and military may be 
affected at the medium and long-terms.   
 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES  
BOOKS, BOOKS CHAPTERS AND PAPERS 
Ai Camp, Roderic. 1992. Generals in the Palacio. The Military in Modern Mexico. 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2005. Mexico’s Military on the Democratic Stage. 1st ed. Wesport, 
Connecticut: Praeger Security International. 
Ai, Camp, Roderic. 2014. Politics in Mexico. Democratic Consolidation or Decline? 
6th ed. New York Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Artz, Sigrid. 2003. La Militarización de La Procuraduría General de La República : 
Riesgos Para La Democracia Mexicana USMEX 2003-04 Working Paper Series. 
USMEX 2003-04 Working Paper Series. 
Astorga, Luis. 2007. Seguridad, Traficantes Y Militares. El Poder Y La Sombra. 1st ed. 
Mexico DF: Tusquets Editores. 
Fazio, Carlos. 1996. El Tercer Vínculo. De La Teoria Del Caos a La Militarización de 
México. Mexico DF: Joaquin Mortiz. 
Freeman, Laurie, and Jorge Luis Sierra. 2005. “Mexico: The Militarization Trap.” In 
Drugs and Democracy in Latin America. The Impact of U.S. Policy., edited by 
Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, 1st ed., 263–302. Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
García Luna, Genaro. 2011. The New Public Security Model for Mexico. 1st ed. Mexico 
DF: Litopress. 
Isacson, Adam. 2005. “Drugs and Democracy in Latin America. The Impact of U.S. 
Policy.” In Drugs and Democracy in Latin America. The Impact of U.S. Policy., 
edited by Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, 15–60. Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
J. Dunn, Timothy. 1996a. “The War on Drugs in the US-Mexico Border Region 1981-
1992. Low Intensity Doctrine Comes Home.” In The Militarization of the US-
Mexico Border 1978-1992, edited by Victor G. Guerra, 1st editio, 103–46. Austin: 
CMAS Books (Center of Mexican American Studies, University of Texas at 
Austin). 
———. 1996b. “Introduction.” In The Militarization of the US-Mexico Border 1978-
1992, 1st ed., 1–33. Austin: CMAS Books (Center of Mexican American Studies, 
University of Texas at Austin). 
Lieuwen, Edwin. 1968. Mexican Militarism. The Political Rise and Fall of the 
Revolutionary Army. 1910-1942. The University of New Mexico Press. 
López González, Jesus Alberto. 2012. Presidencialismo Y Fuerzas Armadas En México, 
1876-2012 : Una Relación de Contrastes. 
Lopéz-González, Jesus A. 2012. “Civil-Military Relations and the Militarization of 
Public Security in Mexico, 1989-2010: Challenges to Democracy.” In Mexico’s 
Struggle for Public Security, edited by George Philip and Susana Berruecos, 1st 
ed., 71–98. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Loveman, Brian. 1999. For La Patria. Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America. 
Edited by SR Books. Wilmington, Delaware. 
Lozoya, Jorge Alberto. 1976. El Ejercito Mexicano. Edited by El Colegio de Mexico. 
2nd ed. Mexico DF. 
Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen. 2010. “A Theory of Gradual Institutional 
Change.” In Explaining Institutional Change. Ambiguity, Agency and Power., 
edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, 2nd editio, 1–37. Cambridge: 
Cambridg. 
Manaut, Raul Benitez. 2009. “La Crisis de Seguridad En México.” Revista Nueva 
Sociedad marzo-abri (n
o
 220): 173–89. 
Moloeznik, Marcos Pablo. 2005. “La Naturaleza de Un Instrumento Militar Atípico : 
Las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas.” Revista Fuerzas Armadas Y Sociedad año 19 
(n
o
1): 169–212. 
———. 2010. “The Impact of the Use of Military Force against Drug Trafficking in 
Mexico.” Renglones. Revista Arbitrada En Ciencias Sociales Y Humanidades 52 
(33): 1–14. 
Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” 
The American Political Science Review 94 (2): 251–67. doi:10.2307/2586011. 
———. 2003. “Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible.” In Comparative Historical Aanalysis 
in the Social Sciences, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 
177–207. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2004. Politics in Time. History, Institutions and Social Analysis. Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Pierson, Paul, and Theda Skocpol. 1997. “El Institucionalismo Histórico En La Ciencia 
Política Contemporánea.” Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política 17 (1): 7–38. 
Rivelois, Jean. 1999. “Drogue, Corruption et Métamorphoses Politiques, Application À 
Une Comparaison Mexique-Brésil.” Tiers-Monde 40 (158): 271–96. 
doi:10.3406/tiers.1999.5305. 
———. 2004. “Effets Criminels et Corruptifs Des Systèmes Politiques Brésilien et 
Mexican.” In Brésil, Mexique. Deux Trajectoires Dans La Mondialisation., edited 
by Bruno Lautier and Jaime Marques Pereira, 287–320. Paris: Éditions Karthala. 
Ronfeldt, David. 1985. “The Modern Mexican Military: Implication’s for Mexico 
Stability and Security.” 
Rouquié, Alain. 2013. Le Mexique. Un État Nord-Americain. Fayard. 
Sandoval Palacios, Juan Manuel. 2000. “Seguridad Nacional Y Seguridad Pública En 
México.” Estudios Sobre Estado Y Sociedad VI (18): 183–222. 
Serrano, Monica. 1995. “The Armed Branch of the State : Civil-Military Relations in 
Mexico.” Journal of Latin American Studies 27 (2): 423–48. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/158121. 
T. Call, Charles. 2002. “War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin 
America.” Comparative Politics 35 (1): 1–20. 
Valdés Castellanos, Guillermos. 2012. Historia Del Narcotrafico En México. México 
DF: Aguilar. 
Wola. Oficina de Asuntos Latinoamericanos en Washington. 1993. ?Peligro Inminente? 
Las FF.AA. de Estados Unidos Y La Guerra Contra Las Drogas. Bogotá: Tercer 
Mundo Editores. 
Zaverucha, Jorge. 2008. “Guaranteeing Law and Order Doctrine» and the Increased 
Role of the Brazilian Army in Activities of Public Security.” Nueva Sociedad 213 
(enero-febrero): 1–31. 
OTHER SOURCES 
Decreto por el que se crea el Cuerpo Especial del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea denominado 
Cuerpo de Fuerzas de Apoyo Federal.  Diario Oficial de la  Federación, México 
DF, 04/may/2007. 
El Universal, 08/05/2007. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/4236 24.html 
Organic Law of the Mexican Army and Air Force. Diario Oficial de la Federación, 
Mexico DF,  26/12/1986. 
 
 
